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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a partitioned BlockChain
based Framework for Auto-insurance Claims and Adjudication
(B-FICA) for CAVs that tracks both sensor data and entity in-
teractions with two-sided verification. B-FICA uses permissioned
BC with two partitions to share information on a need to know
basis. It also uses multi-signed transactions for proof of execution
of instructions, for reliability and auditability and also uses a
dynamic lightweight consensus and validation protocol to prevent
evidence alteration. Qualitative evaluation shows that B-FICA is
resilient to several security attacks from potential liable entities.
Finally, simulations show that compared to the state of the art, B-
FICA reduces processing time and its delay overhead is negligible
for practical scenarios and at marginal security cost.
Index Terms—Connected and Automated Vehicles, Vehicular
Forensics, BlockChain, Adjudication, Dynamic Block, Proof of
Interaction and Execution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) are instrumented
with wide arrays of specialised computers called Electronic
Control Units (ECUs), sensors and connecting technologies
to facilitate independent driving decisions and enable better
perception of the environment to avert road transportation
hazards. The ability of CAVs to make some or all driving
decisions disrupts the current auto insurance claims and ad-
judication process where a physical driver is solely blamed
for an accident. This disruption enables shared liability among
multiple entities interacting with a CAV including the Automo-
tive Manufacturer, Service Technician and Software Provider
and therefore makes adjudication challenging. Consider the
fatal CAV accident scenario described in [1]. In this scenario,
assigning blame was arduous due to lack of transparency in
the adjudication process. Furthermore, with the existing claims
processing model, a claimant in this scenario would have to
painstakingly wait for about 4-12 months for an insurer to
make a decision based on the circumstances of submitted claim
[29].
Given the potential to assign blame to multiple entities, the
adjudication process for CAVs presents further interesting
challenges, including: (1) the motivation of potential entities
to evade liability by altering evidence; (2) keeping track of
relevant interactions between a CAV and other potential liable
entities; (3) providing comprehensive evidence for adjudica-
tion; and (4) ensuring data accessibility.
Previous works that address vehicular forensics significantly
rely on data stored in the Event Data Recorder (EDR); an auto-
motive black-box replica installed in the vehicle for recording
pre and post collision data [2] [3] [4]. Several challenges
however persist with CAVs. First, EDR data does not record
all the relevant interactions of CAVs with other entities. This
prevents existing approaches from making liability decisions
that consider these interactions. Second, modern day vehicles
with communication capabilities log EDR data in central
servers [8] introducing a single point of failure. Third, an
evaluation on proposed techniques for vehicular forensics has
been missing.
In this paper, we argue that BlockChain (BC) [5] technology
has the potential to address the aforementioned challenges.
BC is an immutable and distributed ledger technology that
provides verifiable record of transactions in the form of an
interconnected series of data blocks. BC can be public or
permissioned [25] to differentiate user capabilities including
who has right to participate in the BC network. Public BC
such as for BitCoin [5], enables every participant to create
transactions (BC communications), collaboratively verify them
and append validated transactions to the ledger. Permissioned
BC such as Hyperledger [6] on the other hand restricts
participation by inviting participants to join and allows only
selected participants to maintain the shared ledger.
BC replaces centralization with a trustless consensus which
ensures that no single entity can assume absolute control of
the BC and its contents. The decentralized trust provided by
BC is well-suited for the CAV adjudication process. Also, the
distributed structure of BC delivers robustness to a single point
of failure. Therefore, we propose a BC Framework for auto-
Insurance Claims and Adjudication (B-FICA). B-FICA is a ve-
hicular forensic system for CAVs that facilitates the collection
of relevant evidence from potential liable entities. It consists of
two main tiers namely, operational and decision. Given known
identities of interacting entities in the auto insurance adjudi-
cation model, we use a permissioned BC to ensure that inter-
acting entities are only privy to communications (transactions)
they need to know. The operational partition comprises CAVs,
insurance companies, auto manufacturers, software providers
and service technicians. As evidence, the operational partition
stores specific instructions (software updates, change of CAV
parts) from an auto manufacturer or service technician to a
CAV owner as well as data generated by a CAV when it is
in an accident or behaves in an unexpected way such as over
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speeding or hard slamming of brakes. The aim of tracking
interactions with the CAV is to identify cases of neglect to
instructions, while the CAV data maintains a historical record
of the CAV performance and circumstances surrounding an
accident. To ensure scalability, the operational BC partition
is managed by entities with significant communication and
storage capabilities such as auto manufacturer, insurance com-
pany and service technicians. The decision partition comprises
the legal authorities including the police and courts, the
government transport authorities, insurance companies and
automotive manufacturers. In the decision partition, requests
for complimentary evidence such as witnesses testimonies are
made by insurance companies to the legal and government
transport authorities. Also, contestable decisions reached in
the operational partition are resolved in the decision partition.
Given the infrequent rate of data generation and vested inter-
ests of potential liable entities in adjudication model, B-FICA
introduces a dynamic lightweight consensus and block valida-
tion protocol and a proof of interaction-execution mechanism.
The dynamic lightweight consensus and block validation pro-
tocol allows BC managers to update the BC state for every
received data contributing to evidence to prevent the alteration
of evidence. The proof of interaction-execution mechanism
offers non-repudiation, allows BC managers confirm the status
of a BC communication and helps adjudicators identify if an
accident was due to negligence.
The key contributions of this paper are summarized below:
(1) We present B-FICA; a partitioned BC framework based
on permissioned BC technology for obtaining comprehensive
evidence to facilitate adjudication and claims processing. We
use realistic scenarios to highlight the efficacy of our proposal.
(2) Our BC based framework is tailored to meet the require-
ment for the CAV adjudication process. We incorporate a proof
of interaction-execution mechanism and a dynamic lightweight
consensus and block validation protocol to mitigate malicious
actions by participants.
(3) We conduct a qualitative analysis of B-FICA to evaluate
the resilience of B-FICA against identified attack capabilities
of malicious actors. Also, we conduct a comparative evaluation
of B-FICA with existing approaches.
(4) We characterize the performance of B-FICA via extensive
simulations using NS3 simulator and comparatively evaluate
our proposal against an existing proposal using time overhead
as a performance measure.
This paper is an extension of our preliminary ideas presented
in our previous work [7]. Here we include a use case,
algorithm and evaluations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The proposed
architecture and components are described in Section 2. We
present an overview of transactions in Section 3. Evaluation
results are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents related
works on vehicular forensics and BC applications and Section
6 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
II. BLOCKCHAIN BASED FRAMEWORK FOR INSURANCE
CLAIM AND ADJUDICATION (B-FICA)
In this section, we discuss the details of the BC partitions.
We begin by defining key concepts.
Transactions: Transactions are the basic communication
primitive in BC for information exchange among entities in
B-FICA.
Partitions: Partitions are communication segments that allow
intended communication participants to exchange relevant
transactions contributing to evidence.
Dynamic Block (dBlock): An incomplete block containing
validated transactions that allows validators reach consensus
on the current state of the BC.
Proposers: Proposers are entities that initiate and submit
transactions to the BC.
Validators: Validators are entities that are responsible for
distributedly managing the BC by processing incoming and
outgoing transactions in their partitions.
The proposed framework is presented in Figure 1. It describes
the interaction between key components in B-FICA.
A. BC Partitions
The partitions in our framework are the operational and
decision partitions. These partitions are intended to facilitate
the communication of relevant information across our BC
network. In the operational partition, transactions contributing
to evidence are generated and stored in the dynamic block.
In the decision partition, complimentary evidence is presented
to insurance companies to facilitate compensation payments,
contestable liability decisions are resolved and liability deci-
sions involving multiple vehicles is made.
For BC communications, we utilize existing Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) such as a Certificate Authority (CA) to issue
unique digital identities to BC participants in the operational
partition and decision partition. The certificate or verification
component of the CA is stored in the genesis block which
serves as a starting point of the BC and used to authenticate
and verify transactions.
For communications initiated by a validator and completed
by a CAV, known keys of transaction participants are used
to authenticate the transactions. However for transactions
generated by a CAV such as the accident-related data, we
utilize changeable keys. This is because a CAV is envisaged
to also collect significant personal identifiable information
of the owner and using known keys for communication
might threaten the privacy of the vehicle owner. We utilize
a pseudonym based privacy method similar to the approach
in [30, 31] to address this challenge. In this approach, it
is assumed that at the initial registration of a CAV by a
government transport authority, the CAV is issued a set of
pseudonyms for the purpose of communicating accident-
related data. To prevent data misuse, a law enforcement agency
registers for this service and obtains requisite communication
credentials to participate in the process of uncovering the real
identities of CAVs for adjudication. This approach does not
require a vehicle to store significant amounts of short-lived
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Figure 1. Proposed Partitioned BC Based Framework.
pseudonymous certificate as akin to the public key certificate
(PKC) approach. It offers user-controlled privacy to the CAV
owner by allowing a vehicle to change its pseudonyms at any
given time.
1) Operational Partition BC (OP-BC): The operational
partition comprises all potential liable entities including the
CAV, auto manufacturer, service technician in addition to
the insurance company responsible for paying compensations.
For simplicity we focus on single entities for each of these
however, the framework is generalisable to the case when there
are several of each entity.
We assume that an auto manufacturer provides the software
update needs of a CAV. We also assume that a CAV is 5G-
enabled [30] and has a tamper-resistant storage for storing
accident-related data such as the precise location, speed, time
of event, video and picture data of an accident including data
received from witnesses (Wi) via vehicular communication.
The proposers in the operational partition include the auto
manufacturer, service technician and the CAV while the val-
idators include the auto manufacturer, service technician and
the insurance company. Validators are selected based on their
possession of sufficient resources for processing transactions
and blocks. Also, given that validators could also send trans-
actions in the OP-BC, we utilize a dual signature transaction
mechanism to ensure that transactions initiated by a validator
are acknowledged by the recipient before they are sent to the
BC. This prevents the possibility of a validator generating fake
transactions to evade liability.
In the operational BC, transactions are either signed by a
single participant called single sign transactions or by multiple
participants called multiSig transactions. The key transac-
tions in OP-BC allow participants to report safety events,
provide primary evidence, provide specific instructions, or
notify execution of instructions. Section III provides a de-
tailed description of these transactions. Transactions in the
operational partition are broadcast to the BC network and
stored in the OP-BC. Each block in the OP-BC consists
of two parts namely the block header and transactions. A
block header contains the following: block sequence number
(SEQ. NUM), block ID (BLOCK ID) which is the hash of
the block, the hash of the previous block (PREV.BID) which
ensures immutability and the hash of the transaction altering
the dynamic block (T.ALT.BID) which is a pointer to the last
transaction that changes the state of dblock. For dblock, the
blockID changes for every successfully validated transaction
until dBlock reaches maximum block allowance (BMax) and
appended to OP-BC. The dynamic blockID is also used to
ensure immutability in OP-BC. The motivation for a dynamic
block in our framework is primarily due to the vested interest
of potential liable entities in the outcome of an adjudication
decision and secondarily due to the infrequent rate of data
generation for adjudication. The waiting for transactions in the
running pool to reach BMax before validation offers rogue
OP-BC validators ample time to alter transactions to evade
liability. For example, a rogue auto manufacturer who observes
that a product defect was responsible for the accident could
attempt to alter transactions in the running pool to evade
liability. However, with dblock, the updated blockID would
detect this attack.
Transaction verification and dynamic block validation:
Once a transaction is sent to the OP-BC, the process of
verification and validation begins by a validator checking
first that the transaction generator is an authorized OP-BC
participant. Next it checks to see if the transaction is complete.
For example if a multiSig transaction has the signatures of
all transaction participants and finally if the transaction is
not a duplicate transaction sent by a particular participant.
Algorithm 1 outlines the transaction verification and vali-
dation process in OP-BC. In the OP-BC, we assume that
validators use predefined known keys to generate a dynamic
block (dBlock). Upon a successfully verified transaction, the
transaction is validated in dBlock by computing a new dBlock
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Algorithm 1 Transaction Verification and Dynamic Validation
Input: Transaction
Output: new dBlock ID
1: Verify transaction:
2: Verify PKAV ;
3: if PKAV is not valid for OP-BC then
4: Transaction is invalid ;
5: reject Transaction ;
6: else
7: Validate transaction:
8: Compute new cBlock ID (ndB) ;
9: ndB = Curr.TID + dBlockID ;
10: Verify Computational consistency ;
11: For every successfully verified Transaction ;
12: while dBlock < BMax do
13: ndB = Curr.TID + dBlockID ;
14: end while
15: end if
ID (lines 9, 10). This is done by computing the hash of
the successfully verified transaction (Curr.Tid) and the hash
of dBlock. Once computed, validators compare their values
to ensure computational consistency and reach consensus on
the state of dBlock. The validation process continues until
dBlock reaches the maximum block allowance (BMax). Once
reached, dBlock is appended in the BC. In the case where
different dBlock output is derived, validators disregard current
computation and revert to the last computation where dBlock
ID was consistent across all validators. Then using the last
validated transaction identified by the T.ALT.BID identifier,
OP-BC validators re-initiate the verification and validation
process up until the current transaction to be validated by
checking transaction timestamps. Repeating this process using
the last successfully validated transaction will allow validators
to reach consensus on the state of OP-BC and detect the
likelihood of an attack. If however wrong computation persists
leading to contestable decisions, dBlock is presented to the
decision partition validators for resolution.
2) Decision Partition BC (DP-BC): The decision partition
BC integrates auto manufacturers, insurance companies, legal
authorities and government transport authorities. The pro-
posers in the decision partition include insurance companies
and auto manufacturers. On the one hand, the insurance
companies initiate a request for complimentary evidence to
facilitate processing of insurance claims. On the other hand,
auto manufacturers also initiate a request to identify a liable
CAV in a multi-collision scenario. The validators in DP-
BC are the government transport authority and the legal
authorities who collaborate to reveal to identity of a liable
CAV in a collision scenario. The legal authority also provides
complimentary evidence to an insurance company to facilitate
liability attribution and claims processing. Each block in the
DP-BC consists of a block header and transaction as with the
OP-BC. However, the block header in DP-BC as opposed to
the OP-BC does not include the hash of the transaction altering
the block. This is because validation of transaction in the DP-
BC occurs only when the running pool of transactions have
reached the maximum block allowance (BMax). Also, vested
interest in the outcome of liability decisions is removed in the
DP-BC as DP-BC validators are not considered liable entities
in B-FICA. Once transactions in the running pool of a validator
have reached BMax, the validator creates a new block and
the new block is appended to the DP-BC when consensus is
reached on the state of the new block.
The request for evidence is the sole transaction stored in the
DP-BC. The response to the request is sent as a unicast to
the request initiator and not stored in the DP-BC. This is to
ensure that sensitive privacy related information is not made
public knowledge.
Transaction verification and validation: Upon the receipt of
a RET transaction, validators verify the authenticity of the
transaction by verifying the signatures of proposers. Next,
they verify that transaction is complete. Validators repeat this
process for subsequent transactions until their running pool
reaches maximum block allowance (BMax). Next, validators
create a block containing BMax transactions and repeat the
verification process to ensure that transactions are unique
and verifiable. Once successful, the validation process begins
by computing the hash of all transactions in the current
block. Computed values are compared for consistency and the
successfully validated block is appended to DP-BC.
III. OVERVIEW OF TRANSACTIONS
Having discussed the details in the BC-partitions, we discuss
the details of interactions in each partition facilitated by
the different kind of transactions. Transactions generated by
proposers in our framework are secured using cryptographic
hash functions (SHA256), digital signatures and asymmetric
encryption.
A. Operational BC Transactions
Communication between entities in the OP-BC partition
are referred to as operational transactions (OP-T). OP-T are
evidence used for making liability decisions. They include
relevant interactions between liable entities as well as collision
data to identify cases of product, service and negligence
liability [9]. Product liability refers to scenarios where blame
is assigned to an auto manufacturer for product defect. Service
liability refers to scenarios where the identified last action of
a service technician caused the accident. Negligence liability
refers to scenarios where failure by a vehicle owner to adhere
to instructions from an auto manufacturer or service techni-
cian is found to be responsible for the accident. To capture
these liability scenarios, the following transactions have been
defined for the operational BC partition.
Event Safety Evidence (ESE): A CAV sends this transaction
to the OP-BC when an unexpected vehicle behaviour occurs
such as hard brake slam, detection of wrong way driving and
the detection of slippery road condition [10]. ESE is predicated
on safety messages exchanged in vehicular networks [10]. ESE
is a single sign transaction. Insurance companies use ESE to
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have a historical perception of the behaviour of a CAV.
Primary Evidence Transaction (PET): A CAV initiates
the single sign PET transaction when an accident occurs.
PET contains requisite data describing the accident. When an
accident occurs, the CAVCAV records all the required data,
defined by [11], for making adjudication decisions. Details of
PET is described in Section III-C.
Notification Evidence Transaction (NET): NET is initiated
by a validator requesting the execution of specific action
by a CAV such as carrying out a software update. NET
is a multiSigned transaction requiring the signatures of the
instruction issuer and the CAV to be complete. The multiple
signatures for NET help prevent false notification claims by
malicious validators when an accident occurs. For a software
update instruction, the transaction includes the hash of the
transaction, hash of the update file, dual signatures and a
metadata field which gives details of the update file and a
pointer to the location of the file.
Execution Transaction (ET): ET is initiated by a CAV as
a single sign transaction in response to a NET from an
instruction issuer. ET is linked directly to the NET sent by
a specific instruction issuer. The content of ET includes the
hash of ET, the hash of the NET it is responding to and an
execution status field which is a binary indicator of execution
success or failure. If however, a CAV owner fails to execute
the transaction and claims otherwise, the current firmware
version of the updated device in the CAV could be retrieved for
adjudication purpose. We assume that the retrieved file shows
the time stamp of the execution which is the time the update
was installed by CAV owner. Upon retrieval, the hash of the
file is computed and compared with the hash of the update
file in the BC. If computation differs, CAV owner is blamed
for negligence.
B. Decision Partition BC Transaction
In the DP-BC partition, communications are directed to-
wards providing more evidence to an insurance company to
facilitate compensation payments and identify a liable vehicle
in a multi vehicle collision scenario. To make these decisions,
both insurance company and auto manufacturer initiate a
request transaction.
Request Transaction: In a given collision scenario involving
a single or multiple vehicles, RET is sent by an insurance
company after receiving the primary evidence transaction from
a CAV. RET includes the hash of the RET, collision data
in the primary evidence and the signature of the insurance
company. In response to this request the DP-BC validators
provide complimentary evidence as unicast to the insurance
company.
C. Usage Scenario
We consider a rear-end collision event. Adjudication deci-
sions in the state of the art dispute settlement model in this
scenario attributes blame vehicles behind the leading vehicle
irrespective of the circumstance. This possibility motivates a
rogue leading man-machine driven CAV to intentionally cause
a rear-end collision to receive compensations [12, 13]. We
assume a three vehicles (CAV1, CAV2 and CAV3) collision
scenario and classify vehicles involved in the collision as
host and witnesses. For example, CAV1 is a host vehicle
when it submits PET to OP-BC and becomes a witness when
its data is provided as complimentary evidence or used to
make liability decisions in multi vehicle collision scenarios.
Decision making occurs at two levels. First in DP-BC and
next in the OP-BC. In the first level, liability is attributed to
a liable CAV by DP-BC validators. Once a liable vehicle is
identified, the second level decision is reached in OP-BC using
operational transactions and complimentary evidence obtained
by the insurance company.
In this scenario, the process of making the 2-level liability
decisions follows three distinct phases namely evidence gen-
eration, validation and adjudication. In the evidence generation
phase, CAVs generate PET by collating accident data. In the
evidence validation phase, the validators in the operational
partition confirms that CAVs are valid BC participants and
validates PET. After this, OP-BC validators issue a request
transaction (RET) to DP-BC validators for first level decision
making. In the adjudication phase, DP-BC validators reach de-
cision on the liable CAV and provide complementary evidence
to the insurance company to facilitate second level decisions.
Evidence generation: After the collision, CAV1, CAV2 and
CAV3 independently record their perception of the collision
event and each CAV receives an encrypted version of other
CAVs perception. Once received, the vehicles generates PET
and sends it to the OP-BC. For CAV1, PET details include:
PET = [Tid||Tdata||PKCAV1 ||SigCAV1 ]
Tid is the hash of the transaction, Tdata is the transaction data
which includes accident related data in CAV1 tamper storage
device. PKCAV1 is the public key of CAV1 and SIGCAV1 is
its signature on the transaction. The details of the transaction
data is given below.
Tdata = [(loc, TS, V Epx, TSdata, E(CAV2), E(CAV3), h(Tdata)]
loc represents the location of event. TS is the timestamp on
the data which represents time of occurence. V Epx is CAV1
record of the event, TSdata refers to the hash of the last
recorded picture and video file contained in the tamper-proof
storage device before and during the accident. We store only
the hash of the video and picture files in the BC for scalability
reasons because CAV sensors such as LIDAR and cameras
produce high precision memory intensive data [28]. Therefore,
we assume that actual video and picture file are separately
stored in a cloud storage by the CAV owner. CAV owner
creates a public / private key pair for the cloud storage and
provides public key to operational BC validators to access the
file for adjudication purposes. E(CAV2) and E(CAV3) are
the encrypted accounts of witnesses and h(Tdata) is the hash
of the collision data. It is used to assure its integrity.
Evidence Validation: After receiving the transaction OP-
BC validators execute verification checks described in Section
2 and upon a successful verification the transaction is validated
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in the dynamic block as described in Algorithm 1. Next, the
insurance companies and auto manufacturers of CAV1, CAV2
and CAV3 initiate RET in the (DP-BC).
Adjudication phase: Upon receipt of the request from pro-
posers in the DP-BC partition, validators verify the signatures
of the proposers using their public keys. Next, they perform
integrity checks before analysing transaction data content to
make the first level decision. Integrity check is performed
by verifying that transaction data has not been altered by
computing the hash of transaction data and comparing it
against h(Tdata) in the data content sent by proposers. If
computation differs, data tampering is detected. In-addition,
they decrypt encrypted data to compare the time stamp and
location data across the request transactions received to ensure
data consistency in both time and space. Once integrity checks
are successful, DP-BC validators make first level liability
decision by analysing RET data. Once decided, complimen-
tary evidence is presented to insurance company for liability
attribution in OP-BC.
IV. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide qualitative and quantitative
evaluations of B-FICA. First we demonstrate how B-FICA is
resilient to identified attacks. Next, we comparatively evaluate
B-FICA against existing proposals. Finally, we characterize
the performance of B-FICA.
A. Security analysis
It is assumed that adversaries are rational internal attackers
[14] motivated to evade liability costs. More precisely, an
adversary could be an auto manufacturer or service technician
who could also suffer reputational cost [15] which poses a
significant threat to their revenue and business continuity if
held responsible for an accident. A CAV owner could also be
motivated to commit insurance fraud by staging an accident
to receive compensation for injuries and damages. Table 1
summarizes the mechanisms that enable B-FICA to meet
critical design requirements. Next, we discuss the adversary
model and B-FICA defense mechanisms.
1) Adversarial Model: The adversarial model details the
malicious capabilities of liable entities and demonstrates the
resilience of B-FICA.
Transaction deletion: In the operational partition, a rogue
validator could leverage the infrequent rate of transaction
generation and the significant time it takes for transactions
in the running pool to reach BMax in the OP-BC to delete
implicating transactions so as to evade liability. This capability
distorts the block validation process and makes adjudication
challenging. This process is addressed in our framework via
the dynamic block validation process where transactions are
validated as they are received. The dynamic block validation
results in an updated block ID for successfully validated
transaction.
Sign fake transaction: A rogue OP-BC validator could
compromise a CAV, sign a fake transaction so that the adjudi-
cation process would blame the CAV owner for neglecting an
instruction that could have prevented the accident. This attack
is addressed in our framework using the transaction alter field
in the dynamic block which allows all validators to keep track
of the last validated transaction in a dynamic block. Also,
the dynamic validation process described in Section 2 would
enable validators to detect this attack.
Collusion: We define two cases of collusion attack across the
BC-partitions below.
* OP-BC Collusion (False Transaction): In this case, the
rogue validators collude to generate and sign a false transac-
tion, verify and validate a block to achieve same BC state.
We address this collusion attack using our dynamic validation
process which requires validators to verify computational con-
sistency for every successfully validated transaction to reach
consensus on the current state of the dynamic block. Unless
rogue validators are able to anticipate an accident and send
the false transaction before the occurrence of an accident, its
of no use sending a false transaction after a primary evidence
transaction has been validated in the dynamic block (dblock).
If however, they collude to periodically send false transaction
to be exempted from liability when an accident occurs, a CAV
owner would be able to detect this since it is authorised to
read BC data.
* DP-BC Collusion (Modification Attack): in this case, an
auto manufacturer colludes with its CAV to modify the content
of Tdata, computes a new hash value of the data hnew(Tdata)
and sends the modified content in a request transaction to
the DP-BC. We detect this attack during the verification of
transactions sent by all concerned auto manufacturers and
insurance companies. Validators comparatively verify the hash
of Tdata presented by all proposers and check the timestamp
on the data and location of event.
Sensor Alteration: A rogue OP-BC validator could compro-
mise an evidence generating sensor to produce authenticated
messages that contain misleading information. To detect this
attack, we solely rely on the verification of data consistency.
B-FICA comparatively verifies data generated by a CAV
with data generated by other CAVs involved in the accident
contained in the request transaction submitted by DP-BC
proposers. Data consistency is also comparatively verified in
both time and space by checking data timestamps and location.
However, in the case where there are no witnesses, this attack
can still go undetected.
B. Comparative Evaluation
In this section, we discuss further aspects of B-FICA and
comparatively evaluate it with B4F[24] a closely related adju-
dication framework. The comparison highlights the strengths
of our proposed framework which are summarised in Table 2.
1) Proof of storage: Recall that (Section 3-D), memory
intensive data such as pictures and videos are stored in a
cloud storage. This data is very useful in B-FICA for making
adjudication decisions and processing insurance claims. In
order to prove that data stored in the cloud storage has not
been altered by the data owner (CAV owner) who could be
motivated to evade liability, B-FICA stores the hash of the
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Table I
REQUIREMENT FOR BLOCKCHAIN BASED ARCHITECTURE
Requirement Approach
Authorization Partitions restrict communication to only authorized partition participants and allows communication to occur only on a need-
to-know basis. The genesis block in each partition contains the verification credentials of a Certification Authority (CA). The
verification credential is unique for both partitions thus allowing only members in a given partition to authenticate and verify
transactions.
Integrity Transaction identifier (Tid) represents the hash of a transaction and used to ensure that a transaction originating from an BC
participant is not modified. Also, we hash data contents in a transaction such as the primary evidence transaction to identify cases
of evidence alteration.
Secure storage Transactions that have been successfully verified are committed in the BC for adjudication. Also, by validating transactions in
dblock, evidence alteration is prevented. Furthermore, by storing data on the BC and dynamically validating transactions, we
prevent the possibility of a rogue validator to make evidence unavailable.
Non-
repudiation
Transactions in a dynamic dBlock are signed by all transaction initiators and verified by partition validators to prevent denial of
action and to ensure auditability.
Decentralization No single validator can independently make decisions on what data constitutes evidence. Data contributing to evidence are
collaboratively verified by validators and only successfully verified transactions can be used to make liability decisions.
data on the BC for integrity checks and non-repudiation.
The authors in [30], [32] conducted an experiment on the cost
of storing accident videos in the cloud which is the cost of
signing, transmitting, verifying and decrypting the file. In their
experiment, they varied the size of accident files between 2 - 8
GB and utilized a data transfer rate of 1.2 GB/s even though it
is predicted that the connection speed for 5G-enabled vehicles
will be up to 1 Tb/s already achieved for stationary wireless
connection [33]. Based on their results, the time overhead to
deliver a 2 GB video file requires between 20 seconds to 1
minute and an 8 GB video file requires 1-3 minutes.
2) Proof of interaction: The attribution of liability and
processing insurance claims in the CAV-setting requires that
an adjudicator is able to establish the actual liable entity in
case of an accident to prevent wrong decisions. To achieve
this, the authors in [9] defined product and negligence liability
to identify when a validator is at fault and when a CAV
owner is at fault. In B-FICA, beyond storing accident-related
data in the BC, we also prove that an interaction between
liable entities have occurred. In the following, we outline a
use case justifying this design choice. Consider a scenario
where an auto manufacturer sends an update instruction to
a CAV owner and the CAV owner fails to execute the update
instruction and an accident occurs due to that faulty sensor.
In alternative proposals such as [24], storing the hash of
the update instruction in the BC serves as proof that the
auto manufacturer sent the instruction. However, there is no
proof to show that the target CAV received and executed
the update instruction. This could lead to contestable liability
decisions and wrong liability attribution. To address this, B-
FICA incorporates an acknowledgement (ACK) mechanism
which allows a CAV owner to confirm receipt of the update
instruction sent by the auto manufacturer and a proof of
execution mechanism which informs BC validators if the
transaction was successfully executed or not. This is so that
in the use case described above, if a software bug still exists
after executing the update, the auto manufacturer would be
liable and if no proof of execution is received, the CAV owner
would be responsible for the accident.
3) Practical benefits of B-FICA: We illustrate the practical
benefits of B-FICA over B4F [24] using the CAV accident
scenario presented in [1] where the driver was killed in
the accident. In this scenario, making adjudication decisions
was difficult because evidence was made inaccessible by
a competing party. In the existing liability attribution and
claims processing model this exceptional scenario could hinder
making claims decision for at most 12-months [29]. A variant
of this could be that competing parties selectively decide
on what data contributes to evidence. B-FICA and B4F[24]
both integrate all potential liable entities in the BC network
and show comparable performance. However, B4F [24] is
both vulnerable to contestable liability decisions as described
above and selective data disclosure. Using B4F, a potential
liable validator could decide to store only BC transactions that
shield it from liability. This is because the validators in B4F
separately store their interactions with the vehicle and possess
significant control over what data is stored in the BC. An
example could be that a service technician after a maintenance
activity on a CAV includes services it did not render in the
maintenance report and stores the hash of the report in the
BC. B-FICA on the other hand allows all validators to process
all transactions contributing to evidence and using an ACK
mechanism, transaction participants are apprised on what data
is stored in the BC.
C. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of B-FICA via
extensive simulations. We distinctly evaluate the performance
of the operational and decision partitions based on transactions
processed in the partitions since they independently process
transactions. To evaluate B-FICA, we use the NS-3 [16]
simulator as it has been extensively utilized as an evaluation
tool to analyze peer-to-peer networks.
We consider the primary evidence transaction and notification
evidence transaction as primary evaluation transactions on
which other transactions are predicated. More precisely, the
request transaction is initiated after a primary transaction has
been received by the OP-BC validators and the execution trans-
action sent by a CAV is based on the notification transaction
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Table II
COMPARING B-FICA WITH B4F [24]
Features B-FICA B4F[24] Implication and Approach
Liability type (Prod-
uct and Negligence)
[9]
Both Product B-FICA presents a holistic approach in the adjudication process. This is because it also keeps track of the
interactions between potential liable entities to identify cases of liability due to negligence. It uses multiple
signatures (MultiSig) to identify negligence and prevent repudiation of actions by ensuring that transaction
participants acknowledge received transactions. This is not possible in B4F.
Independent storage
of evidence
Not pos-
sible
Possible This leads to selective data sharing which allows a validator to influence the outcome of a liability decision.
This is akin to the B4F framework where a validator stores its interaction with a CAV separately and is expected
to store the hash of such transactions in the BC. However in B-FICA all data contributing to evidence is sent
to the BC and processed by all validators. This is because while B4F treats validators as trusted entities, we
argue that they could be motivated to repudiate their actions.
initiated by an auto manufacturer or service technician.
To realistically simulate the primary evaluation transactions,
we utilize the road casualty crash data of New South Wales
(NSW) [17] to simulate the generation of primary evidence
transaction. The crash data report presents the traffic casualties
for 2016. It gives a description of the type of crash which
describes vehicles involved in a crash and categorizes a crash
based on degrees of impact. For notification evidence, we
assume weekly updates for connected and automated vehicle.
For evaluations, we group the multiple entities in OP-BC into
clusters to reflect operational validators with same CAVs in a
region such as NSW as described in Section 2. For the decision
partition, we consider one legal authority and government
transport authority for a region. Using the crash casualty data,
42 car accidents occur daily therefore, CAVs generate 42 PET
per day and decision partition validators receive 42 request
transactions from insurance companies daily while operational
partitions collectively receive 42 transactions.
BMax involves a tradeoff between overhead and security. This
is because the value of BMax determines when dBlock is
appended to the BC and becomes immutable. While lower
BMax values present larger BC overhead, larger BMax values
increase the vulnerability of dBlock by offering colluding
validators the opportunity to exploit the validation process
described in Section 2. Here, we set BMax to 7 and leave
the definition of an optimal BMax value for future work. We
assume that at least one PET is generated every hour and a
CAV receives one notification transaction weekly. We refer to
the above experimental settings as default configurations and
are used in simulations unless stated otherwise.
In the rest of the section, we evaluate the time taken to
verify and process OP-BC transactions in the dynamic block.
In the decision partition, we evaluate the time it takes to
process transactions in a block and the time overhead in
providing a response to a request evidence. Furthermore, we
comparatively evaluate our implementations against a baseline
implementation (Section IV-2) and existing proposals.
1) OP-BC Partition Performance Evaluation: In the
operational partition, we evaluate the key processes identified
as verification and validation. These processes are critical in
B-FICA because they contribute to how long a complementary
evidence is received and determines when a claims decision
can be reached.
To provide comprehensive simulation, we simulate the
OP-BC transactions: primary evidence, notification evidence
and execution transactions using the following metrics:
Verification time: This refers to the time it takes an OP-BC
manager to confirm conformance to verification policies
(described in Section 2) after a transaction is received in the
BC.
Validation time: This refers to the time an OP-BC manager
processes a transaction in the dynamic block (dblock). It is
measured as the time required to compute a new dblock ID.
Figure 2. Average verification and validation time on OP-BC validators.
The results shown in Figure 2 are the average of 14 runs.
the standard deviation is also shown. As shown in Figure 2,
the notification evidence (NEV) has higher processing time
compared to other transactions. This is because the NEV trans-
action is a 2-signature transaction which requires additional
time for verification checks. Furthermore, most transactions
take several seconds to verify and validate. This can be
attributed to the storage of transaction data on the chain. First,
validators confirm that a transaction meets verification policies
explained in Section 2. Second, validators verify the integrity
of transaction data to ensure that the data has not been altered
during transit by comparing newly computed hash of data to
hash of data in the transaction. Finally, after the transaction
validation process, validators verify their computations for
consistency before a transaction is considered successfully ver-
ified and validated. Verification of computational consistency
concludes the consensus process and ensures that validators
have same computation for dblock ID. This final step also
adds to the overall validation time.
We also compare the verification time to an alternative imple-
mentation that stores only hash of transactions in the OP-BC.
8
Results shows that B-FICA introduces additional verification
overhead (0.30 seconds for PET) which also impacts on how
long before an insurance company receives complimentary ev-
idence and can be attributed to the verification of components
of transaction data for completeness i.e. for example, checking
that Tdata in PET is complete.
2) DP-BC Partition Performance Evaluation: We consider
the time overhead in providing response to a request and the
time it takes DP-BC validators to process transactions in a
block when transactions in the running pool reaches BMax.
Time Overhead: Time overhead refers to the processing time
of the request transaction. It is measured as the time from when
a transaction(s) sent from a proposer is received by validators
until when the proposer receives an appropriate feedback.
Block processing time: This is measured as the time
from when a DP-BC validator generates a block, processes
transactions in the block and appends the block to the ledger.
Time overhead evaluation: To evaluate the time overhead,
we compare B-FICA against 2 alternative implementations. In
the first case called baseline, we use similar transaction flow
as B-FICA however, we do not hash or encrypt transactions.
In the second case, we implemented the idea presented in [24]
where actual transaction data are stored in a personal storage
and hash of transactions are stored in the BC.
The results in Figure 3 shows that B4F expends the most
Figure 3. Comparative time overhead evaluation of B-FICA.
time in processing transactions and providing feedback to the
transaction proposer. This increased overhead can be because
of the additional integrity verification checks conducted by
DP-BC validators on data retrieved from the personal storage
before providing response to the transaction proposer. Integrity
verification hash involves computing the hash of the transac-
tion in the personal storage and comparing it with the hash of
transaction in the BC. This computation time therefore adds
to the time overhead. Furthermore, compared to the baseline,
B-FICA includes an additional overhead of 0.13 seconds to
process transactions. This overhead which could be called
security cost is the time taken for the encryption and hashing
operations.
Block processing time: It takes a DP-BC B-FICA validator
56.2 seconds to process transactions in BMax. Compared to
the alternative hash only implementation, it takes about similar
time (56.3 seconds). This is because similar computation is
performed to ensure DP-BC validators reach consensus (see
Section 2) on the state of the DP-BC.
V. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we provide a brief review about existing
works on vehicular forensics, BC and its application in the
vehicular networks domain.
A. Vehicular Forensics
Existing vehicular technologies enables a range of applica-
tions through vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs). Specifi-
cally, applications needed for vehicles to confirm their current
state or prove their recent behaviors. For example, when
vehicle collision occurs, it is important to maintain an accurate
description of the situation for liability purposes.
The authors in [18] proposed a cooperative collision warn-
ing based motor vehicle event data recorder (MVEDR) for
recording all critical information from a vehicle in an accident
(primary vehicle) and neighbor vehicles for accident recon-
struction. However, while MVEDR represents a vital solution
for accident reconstruction for modern day vehicular forensics,
it solely relies on data in the EDR which records only the
perception of a host vehicle. This therefore makes it unsuitable
for the anticipated CAV adjudication model where liability is
likely to be shared between multiple entities.
The author in [19] proposed EVIGEN protocol for obtain-
ing data about a vehicles behavior from nearby vehicles. It
involves creating a digital document to attest to the data col-
lected for adjudication. While EVIGEN represents an overlay
of MVEDR, it however relies on the availability of witnesses
to obtain reliable data for adjudication.
The authors in [3], [20] have also proposed forensic VANET
applications to facilitate accident reconstruction. They identi-
fied the limitations of alternative proposals and defined dual
sources of evidence for reliable data collection for accident
reconstruction. In their proposal, a host vehicle can record its
perception of an accident and also store data from neighboring
witnesses. However, the challenge is that evidence retrieved
is stored in different centralized databases which presents a
single point of failure [20, 21].
B. Blockchain Applications for Vehicular Networks
In the vehicular networks domain, BC has been proposed for
different purposes. The author in [22] proposed Blackchain, a
BC based message and revocation accountability system for
secure vehicular communication. The authors in [23] presents
a BC based secure architecture for automotive use cases
such as dynamic vehicle insurance which allows an insurance
company to provide specific services to drivers by monitoring
their driving patterns. However their proposal lacks a concrete
example on how this will be achieved. The authors in [24]
proposed Block4Forensic, a BC based solution for vehicular
forensics that integrates concerned entities and facilitates the
provision of necessary data needed for dispute settlement.
However, it does not cover all liability types as specified
in [26] for self driving vehicles therefore, we consider our
proposal a holistic solution for vehicular forensics.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a Blockchain based Framework
for auto-Insurance Claims and Adjudication (B-FICA) for
connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). B-FICA enforces
access control using partitions to prevent unauthorised access
to data contributing to evidence and uses a dynamic valida-
tion protocol to prevent evidence alteration. Using a likely
scenario, we demonstrated the efficacy of B-FICA describing
how evidence is generated and processed. Security analysis
demonstrates mechanisms utilised by B-FICA to achieve de-
sign requirements and its resilience against a broad range of
malicious actions of potential liable entities. Simulation results
shows that the proposed framework significantly decreases
processing time compared to the state of the art. Generally,
B-FICA brings credibility to the adjudication model for CAVs
and prevents data misuse at a marginal cost.
Our current work provides comprehensive information to deci-
sion makers, proves interaction between entities in the adjudi-
cation model and prevents potential liable entities from altering
submitted evidence. An interesting direction for future work is
to implement attestation protocols to ensure the correctness,
reliability and integrity of data submitted for evidence by a
connected and automated vehicle. Another future direction is
to relax the assumption that the auto manufacturer provides the
software needs of a CAV and consider third party providers.
We expect variations of B-FICA to be applicable in other
liability scenarios, such as home or health insurance.
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